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1. Introduction
TAXONOMY MATTERS: ARISTOTLE. If the interest an author takes in a subject 
can be measured at all, the educated guess would be that it is commensurate 
with the attention he devotes to it. It thus seems a fair assessment to say 
that –when handling sophistical topics– classifi catory issues were a matter 
of great concern to Aristotle. For one thing, he discussed at length and 
eventually discarded at least one competing classifi cation of fallacies 
according to which these are to be differentiated depending on whether they 
aim at the thought or at its verbal expression1. For another, he remarkably 
engineered his own taxonomy. An all-embracing genus, the ignorance of 
what a refutation is2, encompasses two comprehensive species –one dwelling 
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1 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, Ed. by D. ROSS, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1958, 
10, 170b 12-16: «οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαϕορὰ τῶν λόγων ἣν λέγουσί τινες, τὸ εἶναι 
τοὺς μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ 
ὑπολαμβάνειν ἄλλους μὲν εἶναι πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν 
διάνοιαν, ἁλλ’ οὐ τοὺς αὐτούς [contrary to what some say, there is no distinction 
between arguments aiming at the word and arguments that aim at the thought. In fact, it 
is absurd to think that arguments aim either at the word or at the thought and that they are 
not the same]». The issue is brilliantly discussed in M. HECQUET-DEVIENNE, «La pensée 
et le mot dans les Réfutations sophistiques», Revue philosophique, 2 (1993) 179-196. 
2 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 6, 169a 18-21: «πάντες οἱ τ<ρ>όποι πίπτουσιν εἰς 
τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ϕαινομένη ἀντίϕασις, 
ὅπερ ἦν ἴδιον τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὅρον [all 
fallacies fall under the ignorance of what a refutation is. Those depending on expression 
because the contradiction –which is the distinctive feature of refutation– is apparent 
only; the others because they violate the defi nition of the deduction]». Cf. Aristotelis 
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on language, the other not3– whose twelve subsets4 account for all kinds of 
failures to meet either one of the two requirements a refutation ought to 
meet in order to do its job, which is to establish a real contradiction by 
means of a genuine deduction5. Aristotle even set himself to prove (both by 
way of induction and deduction) that his sixfold division of fallacies which 
have to do with expression is exhaustive: no fallacy involving linguistic 
features has been neglected and none falls outside those he mentioned6.
sophistici elenchi 6, 168a 17-20: «ἢ δὴ οὕτως διαιρετέον τοὺς ϕαινομένους 
συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἐλέγχους, ἢ πάντας ἀνακτέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, 
ἀρχὴν ταύτην ποιησαμένους· ἔστι γὰρ ἅπαντας ἀναλῦσαι τοὺς λεχθέντας 
τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν [apparent deductions and refutations must 
be classifi ed either the way we did or be reduced to the ignorance of what a refutation 
is, which we acknowledge as their origin. In fact, it is possible to show that all the 
aforesaid fallacies neglect one aspect <or another> of the defi nition of the deduction]». 
3 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 4, 165b 23-24: «τρόποι δ’ εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν 
δύο· οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ’ ἔξω τῆς λέξεως [there are two ways of 
refuting: one has to do with expression, the other is independent of it]». As is well 
known, Aristotle’s classifi cation of fallacious reasoning rests upon the alternative 
whether linguistic features play a role or not. Here λέξις means everything that has 
to do with the way we talk about things: written or spoken words may be equivocal 
(homonymy, fi gure of speech and accent exploit their ambiguous features), turns of 
phrase may be equivocal too (amphiboly, composition and division –on the other 
hand– take advantage of their syntactical arrangements).
4 Equally distributed within and outside verbal expression: «ὁμωνυμία, 
ἀμϕιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως [homonymy, amphiboly, 
composition, division, accent, form of expression]» (Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 4, 
165b 24-27) and «παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, […] τὸ ἁπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῂ ἢ 
ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι λέγεσθαι, […] τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, […] τὸ παρὰ τὸ <τὸ> 
ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, […] τὸ <τὸ> μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, […] τὸ τὰ πλείω 
ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιεῖν [the fallacy of accident; the fallacy in which an expression is 
either said without qualifi cation or not without qualifi cation but with some qualifi cation 
related to manner, place, time or relation; the fallacy of assuming the point to prove; 
the fallacy that states that something is cause without it being one; the fallacy that ask 
multiple questions as one]» (Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 4, 166b 21-27) respectively. 
5 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 1, 164b 27-165a 3: «ὁ μὲν [165a] γὰρ συλλογισμὸς 
ἐκ τινῶν ἐστι τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τι τῶν κειμένων διὰ 
τῶν κειμένων, ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ’ ἀντιϕάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος 
[deduction occurs when something new is necessarily involved by what has been 
previously stated. The refutation is a deduction which contradicts what has been 
presented as a conclusion]». 
6 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 4, 165b 28-29: «τούτου δὲ πίστις ἥ τε διὰ τῆς 
ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ συλλογισμός [This can be proved by both induction and deduction]». 
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TAXONOMY MATTERS: ARISTOTLE’S COMMENTATORS. By Galen’s time, the 
topic was popular enough for him to pride himself on having successfully 
dealt with the rationale behind Aristotle’s claim for completeness whilst other 
interpreters had failed to explain it7. Commentators will not forget Galen’s 
lesson and the issue will be addressed as a matter of routine by Byzantine and 
Latin scholars alike. Especially the latters placed considerable emphasis on 
the issue of exhaustiveness and spared no effort in order to describe in detail 
the architecture of Aristotle’s classifi cation. Actually, from the very start, 
Latin commentators stressed the fact that Aristotle’s taxonomy is a coherent, 
principle-ruled, derivational system8. They also spent considerable time 
7 Galeni de captionibus in dictione, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, Commentators and 
Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi, Brill, Leiden 1981, II, pp. 6.22-7.4: 
«τῶν οὖν ἐξηγησαμένων [7] αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν οὐδ’ ἐπεχείρησαν ταῦτ’ ἀκριβῶσαι τὸν 
προσήκοντα τρόπον, οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔτυχον. ἡμεῖς δὲ πειραθῶμεν, οὐκ  Ἀριστοτέλους 
ἕνεκεν οὐδ' ὡς τῷ λόγῳ βοήθειάν τινα πορίζοντες, ἀλλ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν [some 
commentators did not even try go give a precise account of Aristotle’s way, others did 
not succeed. Let’s try, neither for Aristotle’s sake nor for the sake of the text, but for 
ourselves]». Galen managed at best to keep only half of his promise. As far as I know, 
no one – Valentina di Lascio excepted – has ever fulfi lled the other half and delivered the 
real McCoy, that is the key to understand Aristotle’s « proof through syllogism ». That 
she did in a remarkable essay, namely «The Theoretical Rationale behind Aristotle’s 
Classifi cation of the Linguistic Fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations», Logical analysis 
and history of philosophy, 15 (2013) 55-89.
8 Four texts from early Latin literature will illustrate the point. 1. «ignorantia 
elenchi dicitur esse principium et origo omnium fallaciarum, […]. Ad quam quidem 
ignorantiam omnes redargutionis species rediguntur [we say that the ignorance 
of what a refutation is is the principle and the origin of all fallacies [...]. In fact, all 
their species come down to the ignorance of what a refutation is]» (Anonymi summa 
sophisticorum elenchorum, Ed. by L. M. DE RIJK, Logica Modernorum, vol. I, Van 
Gorcum, Assen 1962, p. 416.16-18). 2. Anonymi Aurelianensis I commentarium in 
Sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et 
Latin (CIMAGL), 34 (1979) 162.27-163.6: «convenienter facta est superius fallaciarum 
divisio, ergo aut sic est dividendum apparentes syllogismos, ut supra divisimus, 
aut reducendum omnes in ignorantiam elenchi, ut scilicet dicamus quod in omni 
paralogismo est ignorantia elenchi et omnes fallacia sub illa specie est coartandum. 
[163] Non autem dico quod illi qui primam tenant divisionem sic debeant dividere, sed 
his, id est ab his, est reducendum omnes fallacias sub ignorantia elenchi. Vel his, id 
est secundum hos, qui faciunt hanc, id est constituunt ignorantiam elenchi principium 
omnium fallaciarum, id est quasi genus omnium [the division Aristotle introduced by 
the words “ONE MUST EITHER DIVIDE APPARENT SYLLOGISMS THIS WAY” has been correctly 
established as we did. “OR ONE MUST SUBSUME THEM ALL UNDER THE IGNORANCE OF WHAT 
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trying both to single out each acknowledged kind of fallacious reasoning and 
to list its various moods or subsets. Accordingly, the question «in how many 
varieties a given fallacy comes (quot modis varietur)» received at least as 
REFUTATION IS”, that is: as if we said that every paralogism has to do with the ignorance 
of what a refutation is and that one must subsume every fallacy under ignorance as 
one of its species. I do not claim that those who accept the fi rst classifi cation have 
to make a division according to the second classifi cation, but “THOSE”, that is: they 
must subsume every fallacy under the ignorance of what a refutation is; or “THOSE”, 
that is: for those “WHO DO THAT”, that is: those who make the ignorance of what a 
refutation is the principle of all fallacies altogether, as if it were the genus of them 
all]». 3. Anonymi Aurelianensis II de paralogismis, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, CIMAGL, 16 
(1976) 77.20-21: «omnia genera fallaciarum ad hanc tamquam ad unum genus reduci 
possunt [all the kinds of fallacy may be reduced to the fallacy of the ignorance of what 
a refutation is as if it were their only genus]». 4. Anonymi fallacie londinenses, Ed. 
by L. M. DE RIJK, Logica modernorum, vol. II, Van Gorcum, Assen 1967, p. 672.4-
8: «fallacia secundum ignorantiam elenchi est deceptio proveniens ex obmissione 
aliquorum quae observanda sunt in descriptione elenchi. Et secundum hoc non aliqua 
tresdecim fallaciarum. Unde Aristoteles docet reducere omnes alias fallacias ad hanc 
fallaciam [the fallacy of the ignorance of what a refutation is is a deception that arises 
when one of the requirements to be satisfi ed according to the refutation’s defi nition 
has been neglected. In this respect, the ignorance of what a fallacy is does not belong 
to Aristotle’s thirteen kinds of fallacies. This is why Aristotle advises that all other 
fallacies be reduced to the fallacy of the ignorance of what a refutation is]». That 
being said, taxonomic expediency did not prevent Latin authors from raising problems 
about the fact that ignorantia elenchi seems to be both inclusive of and included in 
the distinction between fallacies that dwell on verbal expression and fallacies who do 
not, in so far as Aristotle ranked it amongst the latters. Peter of Spain, for instance, felt 
the need to address the issue: «fi eri quidem solet duplex distinctio ignorantie elenchi, 
secundum quod est una specialis de tredecim fallaciis, et secundum quod est generalis 
ad quam omnes tredecim fallacie reducuntur [as far as ignorance of what a refutation 
is is concerned, a double distinction is usually made, according to which ignorance of 
what a refutation is is both particular and general. Particular in so far as it is one of the 
thirteen fallacies and general in so far as it is the fallacy to which all others may be 
reduced]» (Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus, Ed. by L. M. DE RIJK, Peter of Spain 
(Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis). Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales, Van 
Gorcum, Assen 1972, VII, p. 180.5-7). As did the anonymous author of the Fallaciae 
ad modum Oxoniae, Ed. by C. R. KOPP, Köln Universität, Köln 1985, p. 128, Albert 
the Great (Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, Ed. by P. JAMMY, C. 
Prost, Lyon 1651, p. 887a), Giles of Rome in his Expositio super libros elenchorum, 
Venetiis per Bonetum Locatellum, 1496, 18vb 28-34 and Anonymus agdavensis in 
his Quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchus, Ms Anger, Bibliothèque municipale, 418 
(405), f. 180ra 24-25. 
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much attention as the question «what the fallacy itself is (quid sit)»9. Moreover, 
Westerners resorted to specifi c devices in order to solve classifi catory puzzles. 
Besides the inherited opposition between Form and Matter which was much 
used to tell apart sophisms whose mistake is to jeopardize either the identity 
of their subject matter or the compelling form of their entailment10, the most 
sophisticated tool –and the more innovative too– they developed along the 
way was the distinction to be made between the way an argument goes 
wrong and the way it fools us. On that ground, they differentiated between 
what they called a causa apparentiae (what gives an argument a respectable 
appearance) and a causa defectus or non existentiae (the reason why –despite 
looking good– it is defective or fails to imply its conclusion)11. All of which 
9 In fact, more often than not, the two questions went hand in hand, as is illustrated 
time and again by the use of formulaic repetitions. Cf. e.g. Anonymi Cantabrigiensis 
commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, Ms Cambridge, St John’s D.12, f. 
85rb («dicatur quid sit aequivocatio, quid fallacia secundum aequivocationem, quot 
modis habeat fi eri [it ought to be explained what homonymy is, what the fallacy of 
homonymy is and in how many varieties it comes]», f. 86rb («circa hanc fallaciam 
considerandum quid sit amphibologia, quid fallacia secundum amphibologiam, et quot 
modis habeat fi eri [about this fallacy one must take into account what amphiboly is, 
what the fallacy that dwells on amphiboly is and in how many varieties it comes]»), f. 
87va («videndum est ergo quid sit compositio, quid divisio, quid fallacia compositionis, 
quid fallacia divisionis, quot modis fi ant istae fallaciae [we have to consider what 
composition is, what division is, what the fallacy of composition is, what the fallacy 
of division is and in how many varieties they come]»), f. 88vb («circa hanc fallaciam 
considerantdum erit quid sit fi gura dictionis, quid fallacia secundum fi guram dictionis, 
et quot sunt huius fallaciae modi [about this fallacy one must take into account what 
fi gure of speech is is, what the fallacy that dwells on fi gure of speech is and in how 
many varieties it comes]»), f. 89va («videndum est quid sit accidens, quid fallacia 
secundum accidens, quot modi paralogismorum fi ant secundum hanc fallaciam [we 
have to consider what accident is, what the fallacy of accident is and how many kinds 
of paralogisms occur according to it]»).
10 The literature on «logical form» vs. «logical matter» is both extensive in 
quantity and varied in quality. Besides J. BARNES, «Logical Form and Logical Matter», 
in A. ALBERTI (ed.), Logica, Mente e Persona, Olschki, Firenze 1990, pp. 16-39, 
which is quoted at every turn, a sensible introduction to the problem is to be found 
in S. EBBESEN, «The Way Fallacies were Treated in Scholastic Logic», CIMAGL, 55 
(1987) 107-134.
11 The early Dialectica monacensis makes the distinction very clearly when 
tackling the fallacy of fi gure of speech: «fallacia autem fi gurae <dictionis> est 
deceptio proveniens ex similitudine dictionis cum dictione, vel etiam ex diversitate 
signifi catorum vel consiginifi catorum. Heae enim sunt causae ipsius moventis, scilicet 
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makes perfect sense, notably for two reasons: fi rst of all, Aristotle makes it 
causa apparentiae ex parte signi et causa falsitatis ex parte signifi cati vel consignifi cati 
[the fallacy of fi gure of speech arises because of the similarity between expressions 
and the diversity between the things these signify or cosignify. Two are, in fact, the 
causes that bring about fallacies of this kind, that is: a cause which accounts for their 
deceptive appearance, which has to do with words, and a cause which accounts for their 
falsehood, which has to do with the things these words signify or cosignify]» (Tractatus 
de sophistica argumentatione (Dialectica monacensis), Ed. by DE RIJK, Logica 
Modernorum, II, p. 579.9-13). Along the same lines, Peter of Spain established two 
sets of synonymous expressions, which will become pretty standard in later literature: 
«principium autem motiviun sive causa apparentiae in qualibet fallacia est quod movet 
ad credendum quod non est. Principium vero defectus sive causa falsitatis est quod 
facit creditum esse falsum [the cause or the principle which produces the deceptive 
appearance in every fallacy is what leads someone to believe what is not the case. 
The principle of the fl aw or the cause which accounts for the fallacy’s falsehood is 
what is actually responsible for the falsehood of what one is led to believe]» (Petri 
hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, p. 98.13-16); further, in a digression, he shrewdly 
remarks: «in aequivocatione principium motivum ab unitate dictionis sumitur et 
principium defectus a parte rerum signifi catarum [in the case of fallacies of homonymy, 
the principle that accounts for the deception has to do with single words which mean 
more than one thing, whereas the principle of the fl aw has to do with the things the 
ambiguous word signifi y or cosignify]» (p. 122.5-7; cf. p. 128.13-15 for a similar point 
concerning the fallacy of accent). The distinction itself will be successful enough to 
serve as a structuring factor in commentators’ questioning, as is most clearly the case 
in the Summa Lamberti, Ed. by F. ALESSIO, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1971, VII, where 
the very same questions are asked about any given family of fallacies, namely what 
are its causa apparentiae, its causa defectus and its modi: cf. e.g. «sequitur de fallacia 
accentus circa quam videndum est quid sit accentus, et quid fallacia accentus, quae 
causa apparentiae, quae causa falsitatis in ipsa, et quot sunt modi paralogizandi in ipsa 
[the fallacy of accent is discussed next and one must consider what accent is, what the 
fallacy of accent is, what causes its deceptive appearance, what accounts for its falsity 
and in how many ways it leads to draw a false inference]» (p. 166.1-4); «sequitur de 
fallacia fi gurae dictionis circa quam videndum [169] est quid sit fi gura dictionis et quid 
fallacia fi gurae dictionis, quae causa apparentiae, quae causa falsitatis et quot modi 
paralogizandi sunt in illa fallacia [the fallacy of fi gure of speech is discussed next and 
one must consider what fi gure of speech is, what the fallacy of fi gure of speech is, 
what causes its deceptive appearance, what accounts for its falsity and in how many 
ways it leads to draw a false inference]» (pp. 168.43-169.3); «in paralogismis qui fi unt 
secundum accidens semper oportet tria reperiri: secundum rem, substantiam et accidens 
assignatum vel attributum, ideo videamus prius quis terminus debeat dici generaliter res 
subiecta, quis accidens et quis attributum et per hoc videbitur quid sit accidens; postea 
videndum est quid sit fallacia accidentis, quae causa apparentiae, quae causa falsitatis 
et quot modi paralogizandi sunt in ea [in fallacies of accident one always need to fi nd 
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clear from the start12 that his main concern with sophistic arguments is not so 
much that they are poor arguments but rather that they manage not to appear 
so13. Secondly and foremost, their place in Aristotle’s classifi cation depends 
on the way this illusion works: for instance, «homonymy», «amphiboly» and 
out three things: what is ascribed or attributed according to the thing, the substance and 
the accident. Therefore, let’s consider fi rst which term generally deserves to be called 
a subject, which one deserves to be called an accident or an attribute. This way, we 
will ascertain what accident means here. One has to consider next what the fallacy of 
accident is, what causes its deceptive appearance, what accounts for its falsity and in 
how many ways it leads to draw a false inference]» (p. 173.28-35); «sequitur de fallacia 
consequentis, circa quam videndum est quid sit consequens, quid fallacia consequentis, 
quae causa apparentiae, quae causa falsitatis et quot sunt modi paralogizandi in ea [the 
fallacy of consequent is discussed next and one must consider what consequent is, what 
the fallacy of consequent is, what causes its deceptive appearance, what accounts for its 
falsity and in how many ways it leads to draw a false inference]» (p. 195.8-11). 
12 Cf. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 1, 164a 20-26: «περὶ δὲ τῶν σοϕιστικῶν 
ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν ϕαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων, ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ 
ἐλέγχων, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ ϕύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ μὲν 
εἰσὶ συλλογισμοί, οἱ δ’ οὐκ ὄντες δοκοῦσι, ϕανερόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων τοῦτο γίνεται διά τινος ὁμοιότητος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ὡσαύτως ἔχει 
[we will discuss the sophistical refutations, that is, refutations which appear to be 
so while they are not, being paralogisms instead. As befi ts the natural order, we will 
begin with what come fi rst. That some deductions are really what they seem to be, 
while others only looks like deductions, is evident. As it happens in other matters, 
this arises from similarity. And this is the case with arguments as well]».
13 Albert the Great will stress the fact that where there is no such appearance there’s 
no fallacy involved either: «si causam apparentiae non haberet, non deciperet [where 
nothing produces a deceptive appearance, there is no deception either]» (Alberti magni 
expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 850b 52-53). A similar point is made by Giles 
of Rome: if a bad argument does not appear to be sound, it is not a fallacy (cf. Aegidii 
romani expositio super libros elenchorum 58vb 47-48: «dubitaret forte aliquis, quia 
videtur hic nullam esse fallaciam, nullam enim videtur habere apparentiam [one might 
be perplexed, for no fallacy seems involved here, since there is no deception]»). Simon 
of Faversham will do the same: «paralogismus enim secundum quamlibet fallacia 
debet apparere bonus syllogismus, aliter non falleret; ergo oportet quod quaelibet 
fallacia habeat aliquid quod faciat ipsam apparere esse bonum syllogismum [whatever 
the fallacy involved, a paralogism has to look like a sound deduction, otherwise it 
would not be deceitful. Therefore, any fallacy whatsoever needs something that makes 
it looks like a sound deduction]» (Simonis de Faverisham quaestiones novae super 
libro elenchorum, Ed. by S. EBBESEN – T. IZBICKI – J. LONGEWAY – F. DEL PUNTA – 
E. SERENE – E. STUMP, Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1984, q. 10, 
p. 128.122-124).
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«fi gure of speech» all involve a double meaning14, but they are not deceitful 
in the same way15. And this is indeed why they are distinct fallacies: they 
may well share the same causa defectus, but –their causa apparentiae being 
different– they are different. This is of course a pretty strong claim, but it is 
not at all an unusual one in medieval literature16. A typical example is to be 
found in the views of Anonymus salmaticensis-fl orentinus, who is strongly 
committed to the idea that the reason why a fallacy does not look like one 
14 This is openly stated in Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 6, 168a 23-25: «τῶν μὲν 
γὰρ ἐν τῇ λέξει οἱ μέν εἰσι παρὰ τὸ διττόν, οἷον ἥ τε ὁμωνυμία καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ 
ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη [some fallacies that have to do with expression depend on a double 
meaning, as –for instance– homonymy, amphiboly and fi gure of speech]».
15 This is precisely the way Anonymous cordubensis explains why the three 
are different fallacies, that is, on account of their different principia apparentiae. 
Since «fallaciae distinguuntur penes principia apparentiae, ipsarum fallaciarum 
diversarum necesse est esse diversa principia [fallacies are told apart mostly by the 
principles that account for their deceptive appearance, for different fallacies must 
have different principles]» (Anonymi Cordubensis quaestiones super sophisticos 
elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, Incertorum auctorum quaestiones super sophisticos 
elenchos, G.E.C. Gad, Copenhague 1977, q. 820, p. 306.10-11), «ad hoc dicitur quod 
principium apparentiae proprium aequivocationis per quod distinguitur a quolibet 
loco sophistico est unitas vocis incomplexae secundum materiam et formam. Ex hoc 
enim patet distinctio eius a fallacia amphiboliae quoniam in amphibolia est unitas 
vocis complexae, hic autem vocis incomplexae […]. Distinguitur autem a fi gura 
dictionis quoniam in fi gura dictionis non est unitas vocis incomplexae secundum 
substantiam vocis, sed solum secundum similitudinem terminationum [The answer 
to that is: the principle which both accounts for the deception peculiarly associated 
with homonymy and allows to tell homonymy apart from any other fallacy is the 
material and formal unity of the single word which happens to be ambiguous. 
It is thereby evident why the fallacy of homonymy differs from the fallacy of 
amphiboly, in so far as the unity involved is alternatively the unity of a single 
expression (homonymy) or the unity of a complex expression (amphyboly) [...]. 
The fallacy of homonymy also differs from the fallacy of fi gure of speech, for in 
the latter the unity involved is not the unity of a single expression according to its 
substance, but rather the unity according to the similarity between words because 
of their ending]» (Anonymi Cordubensis quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, q. 
820, p. 307.24-35).
16 Cf. e.g. Thomae de Aquino (?) de fallaciis, Ed. by H. F. DONDAINE, Editori di 
San Tommaso, Roma 1976, p. 405a 16-48 and p. 405b 1-30. Anonymi C&G 611-II 
quaestiones in sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, «Texts on Equivocation. Part 
II. Ca. 1250 - ca. 1310», CIMAGL, 68 (1998) 183.17-20. Radulphi britonis quaestiones 
super sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, CIMAGL, 53 (1986) 122.15-19 and 
123.15-19.
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is both its most important and its most distinctive feature17. Another good 
example is Simon of Faversham, for whom what produces the illusion that a 
fallacy is a sound argument is the very thing that makes it the fallacy it is. In 
Simon of Faversham’s words, the causa apparentiae is to perform a double 
function, that is, on the one hand, it makes it possible to tell good arguments 
from bad ones and, on the other hand, it sets any given fallacy apart from any 
other18.
WHEN TAXONOMY FAILS: A CASE STUDY. Sure enough, Aristotle and 
medieval commentators alike allowed for occasional overlaps between 
families of fallacies19. After all, no stretch of imagination is required to 
17 It is plain that, in the Anonymous’ eyes, sophistical appearances are not only 
utterly important but that they also make all the difference in taxonomical matters: 
Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by 
S. EBBESEN, Incertorum auctorum quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, q. 82, 
p. 189.25-33: «in fallacia nihil est prius causa apparentiae, cum ex ipsa ratio fallaciae 
accipitur […]; a causa enim apparentiae sumitur ratio fallaciae in se et distinctio eius 
ab omnibus aliis [in a fallacy nothing takes precedence over the cause that accounts 
for its deceptive appearance, since it is the very thing that makes a given fallacy the 
fallacy it is [...]; as a matter of fact, the cause that accounts for a fallacy’s deceptive 
appearance accounts also for both its being the fallacy it is and the way it differs from 
any other fallacy]».
18 Simonis de Faverisham quaestiones novae super libro elenchorum, q. 20, 
p. 151.27-29: «illud est causa apparentiae in aliqua fallacia quod facit ipsam esse 
fallaciam et quod facit ipsam esse distinctam ab omnibus aliis [in any fallacy the cause that 
accounts for its deceptive appearance is the very thing that makes it a fallacy and makes it 
differ from any other fallacy]». Furthermore, Simon of Faversham will identify the causa 
apparentiae with the formal principle of the fallacy itself: «sicut entia distinguuntur 
per suas formas ita distinguuntur fallaciae per suas causas apparentiae. Causa enim 
apparentiae in qualibet fallacia est quid formale. Et ideo fallacia quae habet causam 
apparentiae distinctam est fallacia distincta [just as things differ because of their forms, 
fallacies too differ because of the causes that account for their deceptive appearance. In 
fact, such causes are their formal element. Therefore, two fallacies that have not the same 
cause that account for their deceptive appearance are different]» (Simonis de Faverisham 
quaestiones novae super libro elenchorum, q. 33,  p. 189.22-25).
19 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 24, 179b 17: «οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον 
πλείους μοχθηρίας ἔχειν [nothing prevents the same argument from having multiple 
fl aws]». Cf. Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 417.22-24; Fallaciae 
vindobonenses, Ed. by DE RIJK, Logica Modernorum, I, p. 525.26-27; Anonymi 
monacensis commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by L. GAZZIERO, «The Latin 
“Third Man”. A Survey and Edition of Texts from the XIIIth Century», CIMAGL, 81 
(2012) 42.12-15; Roberti <Kilwardby> commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, ibid., 
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fancy nasty quibblers trying more than one trick at a time or clumsy people 
rambling when reasoning in their heads. But such trespasses are so gross 
that they are not much of a threat to the integrity of Aristotle’s division. 
That being said, other entanglements are of a more serious nature and 
may possibly lead to the conclusion that a structural revision of Aristotle’s 
taxonomy is in order, but –then again– such crossings are vouched for by 
Aristotle himself: the fi rst examples that spring to mind are –of course– the 
inclusion of the fallacy of consequent within the fallacy of accident and the 
symmetry between the fallacies of composition and division20. Medieval 
authors provided nice, even funny examples of fallacies open to more than 
one interpretation21. Still, some crossovers are neither trivial nor supported 
by the text. The one I wish to investigate will turn out to be both disruptive 
and ill inspired.
p. 52.3-22; Nicholai parisiensis notulae super librum elenchorum, ibid., pp. 54.25-
55.8; Roberti codicis veneti commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, ibid., p. 60.6-14; 
Roberti de Aucumpno commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, ibid., p. 78.1-14; Alberti 
magni expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 938b.
20 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 6, 168b 27-28: «οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον μέρος 
εἰσὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος [the fallacies of consequent are a subset of those of accident]» 
(cf. 7, 169b 6-7 et 8, 170a 4-5); 23, 179a 13-15: «παρὰ σύνθεσιν ὁ λόγος, ἡ λύσις 
διελόντι, εἰ δὲ παρὰ διαίρεσιν, συνθέντι [when arguments turn on composition, they 
are to be solved by means of a division; when they turn on division, then they are to be 
solved by means of a composition]» (cf. Aristotelis ars rhetorica, Ed. by R. KASSEL, 
Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1976, II, 24, 1401a 25-26 where Aristotle mentions both 
as one fallacy rather than two: «ἄλλος τὸ <τὸ> διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ 
τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα [another fallacy consists in asserting conjointly what is 
separated and separately what is conjoined]»).
21 Medieval humor is not for all tastes, nor are medieval logicians’ examples (cf., 
e.g., those Abelard peppered his gloses on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias with, edited by 
Y. IWAKUMA, «Pierre Abélard et Guillaume de Champeaux dans les premières années du XIIe 
siècle. Une étude préliminaire», in J. BIARD (ed.), Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe 
siècle, Vrin, Paris 1999, p. 95). The argument they usually brought up in order to illustrate 
fallacies open to more than one solution should be to everybody’s liking: «quicumque sunt 
episcopi sunt sacerdotes; isti asini sunt episcopi; ergo isti asini sunt sacerdotes [all bishops 
are priests; theses asses are bishops (these asses belong to the bishop); therefore, these 
asses are priests]». Cf. Tractatus de sophistica argumentatione (Dialectica monacensis), p. 
562.10-12; Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, p. 108.19-20; Introductiones magistri 
Guillelmi de Shyrewode in logicam, Ed. by C. KANN – W. BRANDS, Meiner, Hamburg 1995, 
VI, p. 172.73-74; Summa Lamberti, VII, p. 152.7-28 and pp. 154.28-155.4; Thomae de 
Aquino (?) de fallaciis IV, p. 407a 56-58; Rogeri Baconi Compendium studii theologiae, 
Ed. by T. S. MALONEY, Brill, Leiden 1988, p. 139, 116.22-23.
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2. Anomalies and random variables 
STATING THE PROBLEM: A STRANGE QUESTION AND AN EVEN STRANGER 
ANSWER. When Medieval Latin commentators asked an odd question, this 
is usually the sign that either they lacked a piece of information or they 
were facing an anomaly in processing available data. When their answer 
proves to be at odds with the basic tenets of a theory they otherwise seem 
to grasp pretty well, one had better start looking for both. The question 
I’ll be using as a Freudian slip of sorts is very odd indeed and it took the 
form of a dilemma: «whether the fallacy of fi gure of speech is a linguistic 
fallacy or not». The answer is even more telling, since no reader in his 
right mind would admit, let alone accept that a sophism depending on the 
shape of words may be independent from expression rather than related to 
it. And yet this is precisely the claim whose grounds I am going to discuss. 
For once, the defi cit in information is not directly related to the status of 
the Aristotelian corpus bequeathed to the Latins over the centuries. It has 
more to do with the fact that no ancient scholium or excerpt had been 
handed down –via Boethius, James of Venice or the Arabs– about the 
most thought-provoking piece of argument Aristotle introduced in order to 
illustrate what fi gure of speech is and how it works, namely the so called 
«Third Man». The anomaly is an occasional (albeit very widespread) 
mismatch between fallacies of accident and fallacies of fi gure of speech, 
which easily qualifi es as one of the most peculiar episodes in the history of 
Aristotle’s Latin exegesis.
THE FALLACY OF ACCIDENT VS THE FALLACY OF FIGURE OF SPEECH. As a 
number of interpreters, both ancient and modern, have suggested22, the 
22 Anonymi glosae in Aristotelis Sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by DE RIJK, Logica 
Modernorum, I, p. 214.20-22: «notandum quod “accidens” dicitur hic predicatum, sive 
de se tantum sive de alio predicetur, sive sit substantiale sive accidentale [it should 
be noted that “accidens” means here predicate, whether it is predicated of itself or 
of something else, whether it is essential or accidental]»; cf. p. 214.10: «secundum 
accidens, idest secundum praedicatum [“secundum accidens”, that is to say predicate 
related]». Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 356.7-10: «“accidens” 
enim ibi largo modo accipitur, scilicet pro quolibet predicato, sive accidentale sit 
sive substantiale [“accident” is taken here in a broad sense and means any predicate, 
whether accidental or essential]». Anonymi parisiensis compendium sophisticorum 
elenchorum, Ed. by S. EBBESEN – Y. IWAKUMA, CIMAGL, 60 (1990) 88.19-22: «accidens 
autem hic appellat Aristoteles praedicatum: cum enim subiectum et accidens relativa 
sunt, et quod in propositione subicitur subiectum dicatur, non debet mirum videri si eius 
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fallacy of accident’s name does not imply that only accidental features 
are involved. As it is the case elsewhere in Aristotle’s corpus23 and as it 
is demonstrated by his own choice of examples24, «accidens» means here 
much the same as «predicate» tout court, that is: without restriction. As its 
defi nition goes25, the fallacy of accident leads to believe that what is said 
praedicatum accidens appelletur [Aristotle calls here “accidens” the predicate. Since 
the subject and the accident are relative and the subject is said to be underlying, it does 
not come as a surprise that its predicate is called “accidens”]». Anonymi cantabrigiensis 
commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, 89vb 17-18: «accidens in hac 
iunctura locutionis “fallacia secundum accidens” dicitur praedicatum sive ipsum sit 
accidentale praedicabile sive substantiale [“accidens” within the expression “fallacia 
secundum accidens” means predicate, whether it is something predicated accidentally 
or essentially]»; cf. 89vb 4-5: «dicitur accidens omne praedicabile sive accidentale 
sive quod non <est> accidentale sive substantiale [we call “accidens” everything 
that may be predicated, either accidental or non-accidental, that is to say essential]». 
Anonymi fallacie londinenses, p. 669.4-5: «accidens prout hic accipitur idem est quod 
praedicatum [the way “accidens” is understood here, it means the same as predicate]». 
Guillelmi de Montibus (?) fallaciae, Ed. by Y. IWAKUMA, «The Fallaciae and Loci of 
William de Montibus. An Edition», Journal of Fukui Prefectural University, 2 (1993) 
15.17-18: «secundum accidens dicitur quasi secundum praedicatum [“secundum 
accidens” means pretty much the same as “predicate related”]». Anonymi fallaciae 
lemovicenses, Ed. by S. EBBESEN – Y. IWAKUMA, CIMAGL, 63 (1993) 30.29: «prout 
hic dicitur accidens idem est quod praedicatus [what is called here “accidens” is the 
same as “predicate”]». Modern scholars who hold the same view are, amongst others, 
M. MIGNUCCI, «Puzzles about Identity. Aristotle and His Greek Commentators», in 
J. WIESNER (ed.), Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1985, I, p. 75, 
D. Zaslawsky, «Le sophisme comme anomalie», in B. CASSIN (ed.), Le plaisir de 
parler. Études de sophistique comparée, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1986, p. 192, and 
L.-A. DORION, Aristote. Les réfutations sophistiques, Presses de l’Université Laval – 
Vrin, Montréal – Paris 1995, p. 233, note 57.
23 συμβαίνω and κατηγορέω  are synonyms in Aristotelis topica, Ed. by 
J. BRUNSCHWIG, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2007, VII, 1, 152a 33-37 and 152b 25-29, 
as well as in Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 7, 169b 4-6. Likewise, συμβεβηκός and 
κατηγορούμενον are synonyms in Aristotelis analytica posteriora, Ed. by W. D. ROSS, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1949, I, 4, 73b 8-10.
24 There can be no doubt that being a man is an essential feature of the individual 
man (cf. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 33-36) or that being a fi gure is an 
essential feature of any given fi gure, a triangle for instance (cf. Aristotelis sophistici 
elenchi 6, 168a 40 - 168b 4).
25 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 5, 166b 28-32: «note 25: οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ 
συμβεβηκὸς παραλογισμοί εἰσιν ὅταν ὁμοίως ὁτιοῦν ἀξιωθῇ τῷ πράγματι καὶ 
τῷ συμβεβηκότι ὑπάρχειν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πολλὰ συμβέβηκεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη 
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of a predicate may be also said of its subject and vice versa26. As a result, 
fallacies of accident occur when one is unable to determine beforehand 
what belongs to both (the subject and the predicate) and what belongs 
πᾶσι τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις καὶ καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται ταὐτὰ πάντα ὑπάρχειν 
[fallacies of “accident” occur when a predicate whatsoever is believed to belong in the 
same way to a thing and to something that is predicated of it. Since many attributes are 
predicated of the same thing, it is not necessary that all the attributes belong both to the 
thing and to all of its predicates]».
26 Medievals acknowledged that the fallacy of accident goes both ways, as 
the following fi ve examples make it pretty clear. Anonymi summa sophisticorum 
elenchorum, p. 356.1-8: «secundum accidens ergo fi unt paralogismi, ut dicit Aristoteles, 
quando quodlibet similiter fuerit assignatum inesse rei subiectae et accidenti, id est 
praedicato, et e converso, id est quando idem assignatur convenire accidenti sive 
praedicato, quod inest et rei subiectae [as Aristotle says, fallacies of accident occur 
when something whatsoever is similarly said to belong both to the underlying thing 
and to the accident, that is to say to the predicate, or – the other way round – when 
it is said to fi t the accident, that is to say the predicate, to which it belongs, and the 
underlying thing]». Anonymi cantabrigiensis commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos 
elenchos, 89vb 19-21: «ut dicatur fallacia secundum accidens deceptio proveniens ex 
omissione \habitudinis/ unius praedicabilis ad aliud sive praedicati ad subiectum sive 
subiecti ad praedicatum [what we call the fallacy of accident is a deception which 
arises from disregarding the relation of one predicate to the other, whether this relation 
is the predicate’s relation to the subject or the subject’s relation to the predicate]». 
Anonymi fallacie londinenses, p. 669.6-9: «fallacia secundum accidens est deceptio 
proveniens ex obmissa habitudine praedicati ad subiectum, vel econverso, quia 
haec fallacia provenit tam ex obmissa habitudine subiecti ad praedicatum quam ex 
obmissa habitudine praedicati ad subiectum [the fallacy of accident is a deception 
which arises from disregarding the relation either of the predicate to the subject or 
of the subject to the predicate, for such a fallacy arises as much from a neglected 
relation of the subject to the predicate than from a neglected relation of the predicate 
to the subject]». Guillelmi de Montibus (?) fallaciae, p. 16.1-7: «incidit autem haec 
fallacia in argumentatione quandoque aliquid assignatur subiecto quod non potest 
assignari praedicato vel e converso. Est enim fallacia secundum accidens deceptio 
proveniens ex omissa habitudine praedicati ad subiectum vel e converso [such a 
fallacy occurs in arguments which ascribe to the subject what cannot be ascribed to 
the predicate and vice versa. As a matter of fact, the fallacy of accident is a deception 
which arises from disregarding the relation either of the predicate to the subject or 
of the subject to the predicate]». Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones super 
Sophisticos elenchos, q. 84, p. 194.24-31: «accidens est aliquo modo idem subiecto de 
quo dicitur et aliquo modo non, et sic sumitur accidens in fallacia accidentis, ut dicit 
Commentator, et secundum hoc dicit modos accidentis: uno modo ex eo quod aliquid 
quod inest praedicato denotatur inesse subiecto, ut “homo est animal, sed animal est
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exclusively to either one (alternatively the subject or the predicate)27. 
As far as such determination depends rather on states of affairs than on 
names, one may safely assume that fallacies of accident have little –if 
anything at all– to do with linguistic considerations. Moreover, even when 
such considerations have been forced upon them, fallacies of accident 
verged on homonymy rather than on fi gure of speech28. Which is one 
 genus, ergo homo est genus”; alio modo ex eo quod illud quod inest subiecto denotatur 
inesse praedicato, ut “Socrates est homo, Socrates est individuum, ergo homo est 
individuum”; et sic duo modi principales sunt [the “accident” is, in a way, the same as 
the thing it is predicated of and, in another way, it is not. As the Commentator has it, 
this is how “accident” has to be understood in the fallacy of the same name and how its 
moods have to be assigned therein. One arises from the fact that what is attributed to 
the predicate is meant to be predicated of the subject as well, as in: “man is an animal, 
but animal is a genus, therefore man is a genus”. Another arises from the fact that what 
is attributed to the subject is attributed to the predicate as well, as in: “Socrates is a 
man, Socrates is an individual, therefore man is an individual”. This is why there are 
two main moods of the fallacy of accident]».
27 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 7, 169b 3-6: «<169a 22: ἡ δ’ ἀπάτη γίνεται> 
τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ 
ἕτερον, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μηδὲ τοῖς ποίοις τῶν κατηγορημάτων πάντα ταὐτὰ 
καὶ τῷ πράγματι συμβέβηκεν [in fallacies of accident the deception arises from the 
incapacity to distinguish what is the same and what is different, what is one and what 
is many, as well as from the incapacity to tell which predicates have the same attributes 
as their subjects]».
28 Although they should have known better –and some of them actually did, 
as argued at length in a forthcoming paper in Acta philosophica: «Exempla docent. 
How to Make Sense of Aristotle’s Examples of the Fallacy of Accident (Doxography 
Matters)»– Latins brought the fallacy of accident and the fallacy of homonymy 
together on the grounds of a variation in the supposition of the middle term observed 
in tokens of both types. Cf. Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 294.10-
16 and pp. 357.25-358.4; Anonymi fallaciae vindobonenses, p. 527.11-29; Anonymi 
tractatus de sophistica argumentatione (dialectica monacensis), p. 585.23-34; Petri 
hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, pp. 106, 148.19-293; Anonymi monacensis 
commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, p. 42; Rogeri Baconi summulae dialectices, 
Ed. by A. DE LIBERA, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge, 54 
(1987) 261, 627-629; Summa Lamberti VII, pp. 181.28-182.11; Thomae de Aquino 
(?) de fallaciis IX, p. 411a 75-88; Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones super 
Sophisticos elenchos, q. 83, p. 192.20-35; Aegidii romani expositio super libros 
elenchorum 17ra 40-45; Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super librum elenchorum 
Aristotelis, Ed. by R. ANDREWS – O. BYCHKOV – S. EBBESEN – G. ETZKORN – G. GAL 
– R. GREEN – T. NOONE – R. PLEVANO – A. TRAVER, The Franciscan Institute St. 
Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure NY 2004, q. 44, p. 471.1-4; Ioannis Buridani 
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more reason Latin commentators should have kept them apart, since they 
ordinarily took very seriously the difference between homonymy and form 
of expression, whose «actual» and «imaginary» polysemy they opposed 
in line with a tradition that –under «Alexander»’s patronage– goes back 
to Galen through Michael of Ephesus and James of Venice29. To make a 
(very) long story short, homonymy is tantamount to using one word with 
multiple meanings30, while fi gure of speech occurs when using different 
quaestiones elenchorum, Ed. by R. VAN DER LECQ – H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS, Ingenium, 
Nijmegen 1994, q. 14, 73.138-143.
29 In this connection, Anonymus digbeianus, Anonymus salmaticensis-
fl orentinus, Simon of Faversham, Anonymus C&G 611-II, Duns Scotus and Radulphus 
Brito especially deserve to be mentioned, for they emphatically underscored such a 
difference. For the sake of brevity, I will only quote Simon of Faversham’s Quaestiones 
veteres super libro elenchorum: «specialiter distinguitur <fallacia aequivocationis> a 
fi gura dictionis, [80] quia in fi gura dictionis sub unitate vocis secundum substantiam 
non latent plura signifi cata, sed magis sub similitudine vocis, et quia ibidem non latent 
plura signifi cata secundum substantiam vocis, ideo dicimus quod ibi est phantastica 
multiplicitas [the fallacy of homonymy especially differs from the fallacy of fi gure 
of speech, for the multiple meanings are not dissimulated by a single word but by 
a similarity between words. In so far as the multiple meanings involved in fi gure 
of speech are not dissimulated by one word only, we call its multiplicity “phanta-
sised”]» (Simonis de Faverisham quaestiones veteres super libro elenchorum, Ed. 
by S. EBBESEN – T. IZBICKI – J. LONGEWAY – F. DEL PUNTA – E. SERENE – E. STUMP, 
Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1984, q. 19, pp. 79.20-80.25; 
cf. q. 10, p. 126.59-63. As for the others, cf. Anonymi digbeiani in sophisticos 
elenchos, S. EBBESEN (ed.), CIMAGL, 53 (1986) 121.17-22; Anonymi salmaticensis-
fl orentini quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, qu. 80, 179.1-3 and 179.21-181.59; 
Anonymi C&G 611-II quaestiones in sophisticos elenchos, p. 183.17-30; Ioannis Duns 
Scoti quaestiones super librum elenchorum Aristotelis, q. 42, pp. 465.7-12 and 19-20; 
Radulphi britonis quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, p. 120.34-36, p. 121.33-34 
and p. 125.13-17. The origin and history of the distinction between multiplex actuale, 
potentiale et phantasticum has been meticulously reconstructed by S. EBBESEN, whose 
«Philoponus, “Alexander” and the Origins of Medieval Logic», in R. SORABJI (ed.), 
Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Infl uence, Duckworth, 
London 1990, pp. 445-462 is the best place to start looking.
30 Cf. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii de divisione liber, Ed. by J. MAGEE, Brill, 
Leiden 1998, p. 8.16-30. Anonymi aurelianensis I commentarium in Sophisticos 
elenchos, p. 85 and p. 95. Fallaciae vindobonenses, p. 499.3-4. Cf. Guillelmi de 
Montibus (?) fallaciae, p. 6.1-3. Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, p. 98.25-26. 
Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae, p. 20, particularly the Q version. Roberti Kilwardby (?) 
commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, «An Inventory of Texts 
about Equivocation», CIMAGL, 67 (1997) 161.28-30. Introductiones magistri 
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words whose morphological resemblance conveys the illusion that they 
signify the same thing or the same kind of things31. The latter is indeed 
the sort of quandaries Aristotle had in mind defi ning fallacies that depend 
on the form of expression32: when things that are not the same are said in 
Guillelmi de Shyrewode in logicam, VI, p. 170.64 and pp. 172.94-174.102. Anonymi 
e Musaeo 133 commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, 
«An Inventory», op. cit., p. 165.12-13 and pp. 165.30-166.3. Nicholai parisiensis 
notulae super librum elenchorum, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, «An Inventory», op. cit., 
p. 170.9-11. Nicholai parisiensis de fallaciis (summae metenses), pp. 474.15-475.3. 
Roberti codicis veneti commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, p. 66.13-14. Summa 
Lamberti, VII, p. 148.28-30. Roberti de Aucumpno commentarium in Sophisticos 
Elenchos, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, «An Inventory», op. cit., p. 184.14-16, p. 185.10-11 and 
p. 188.17-19. Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, pp. 847b.56-848a.2 
and p. 850b.56-59. Anonymi Basileensis quaestiones in Aristotelis Categorias, Ed. by 
S. EBBESEN, «Texts on Equivocation. Part II. Ca. 1250 - ca. 1310», CIMAGL, 68 (1998) 
113.5-11. Thomae de Aquino (?) de fallaciis, pp. 405b 32-406a 10. Anonymi digbeiani 
in sophisticos elenchos, pp. 108.28-109.2. Aegidii romani expositio super libros 
elenchorum, 10rb 3-6. Anonymi Cordubensis quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, 
q. 827, p. 329.43-46. Anonymi tres quaestiones de aequivocatione, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, 
«Texts on Equivocation. Part II», p. 129.10-11 and p. 137.8. Anonymi pragensis 
quaestiones super Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by D. MURÈ, «Anonymus 
Pragensis on Equivocation», CIMAGL, 68 (1998) 74.2-21 and p. 92.11-13. Thomae 
de Wyk fallaciae, Ed. by S. EBBESEN, «Texts on Equivocation», p. 139.9-14. Anonymi 
C&G 611-II quaestiones in sophisticos elenchos, p. 144.18-22, p. 145.9-10 and 16-30. 
Radulphi britonis quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, pp. 192.23 - 193.15 and 
193.6-7.
31 Cf. Anonymi aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos, 
p. 124.31-33; Anonymi Cantabrigiensis Commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos 
elenchos, 88vb; Fallaciae vindobonenses, p. 515.4-12; Fallaciae parvipontanae, Ed. 
by DE RIJK, Logica Modernorum, I, p. 586.24-26; Guillelmi de Montibus (?) fallaciae, 
p. 13.26-28; Anonymi tractatus de sophistica argumentatione (dialectica monacensis), 
p. 578.34-35; Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, p. 135.11-25; Fallaciae ad 
modum Oxoniae, p. 97-98; Introductiones magistri Guillelmi de Shyrewode in logicam 
VI, p. 188.288-290; Rogeri baconi summulae dialectices, p. 254.28-29 and p. 258.6-
259.2; Summa Lamberti VII, p. 169.5-22; Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum 
elenchorum, p. 859.33-43; Thomae de Aquino (?) de fallaciis, p. 410b 2-17; Anonymi 
digbeiani in sophisticos elenchos, p. 63.1-4; Anonymi Cordubensis quaestiones super 
sophisticos elenchos, q. 838, pp. 365.100-366.127; Simonis de Faverisham quaestiones 
novae super libro elenchorum, q. 10, p. 128.117-119; Radulphi britoni quaestiones 
super sophisticos elenchos 121-125 (in particular 123.9-19).
32 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 4, 166b 10-15: «οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς 
λέξεως συμβαίνουσιν ὅταν τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸ ὡσαύτως ἑρμηνεύηται, οἷον τὸ 
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pretty much the same way, this is likely to confuse people about what those 
things are and how they stand with respect to each other.
STATING THE PROGRAM. After addressing the problem of why the fallacies 
of accident and of fi gure of speech do not belong together, we may turn 
our attention to the rather fortuitous chain of events that brought the two 
together. In other words, it is time to ask the question: if fallacies of fi gure of 
speech depend on linguistic features to such an extent that there is no point 
in assuming that they do not resort to language itself one way or another, 
how come then medieval authors repeatedly asked themselves «utrum fi gura 
dictionis sit fallacia in dictione», which I’ll translate without much concern 
for literality: «whether or not the form of expression, as a source of fallacious 
reasoning, depends on expression»? Anonymus salmaticensis-fl orentinus33, 
ἄρρεν θῆλυ ἢ τὸ θῆλυ ἄρρεν ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ θάτερον τούτων, ἢ πάλιν τὸ ποιὸν 
ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ποιόν, ἢ τὸ ποιοὐν πάσχον ἢ τὸ διακείμενον ποιοῦν, καὶ 
τἆλλα δ’ ὡς διῄρηται πρότερον [fallacies of fi gure of speech occur when what 
is not the same is said in the same way; for instance, when something masculine is 
designated by means of an expression which is rather feminine, or when something 
feminine is designated by means of an expression which is rather masculine, or 
when something neuter is said by means of an expression which is alternatively 
rather masculine or feminine; or –again– when a quality is said by means of an 
expression which looks like a term for a quantity or when a quantity is said by means 
of an expression which looks like a term for a quality; or –again– when an action is 
said by means of an expression which looks like a term for an affection or when a 
state is said by means of an expression which looks like a term for an action; and so 
forth according to the division previously made]». Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 7, 
169a 29-35: «τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς λέξεως. χαλεπὸν 
γὰρ διελεῖν ποῖα ὡσαύτως καὶ ποῖα ὡς ἑτέρως λέγεται (σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο 
δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ θεωρεῖν τἀληθές, μάλιστα δ’ ἐπίσταται 
συνεπινεύειν), ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινος ὑπολαμβάνομεν τόδε τι, 
καὶ ὡς ἓν ὑπακούομεν [as far as fallacies of fi gure of speech are concerned, the 
deception arises from the similarity among expressions. In fact, it is diffi cult to 
tell apart things said in the same way and things said differently (he who is able to 
do this is almost on the verge of discovering the truth, all the more so will he be 
able to answer advisedly), for we trust everything predicated of something else to 
be an individual thing and we understand it as being one]». This is a very strong 
philosophical point in its own right and a very wise lesson at that: as a matter of 
course, language by itself teaches us next to nothing about how the world is. Since 
we talk about different realities as if they were just the same, we simply cannot 
trust words to tell them apart.
33 Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, 
q. 75, pp. 170.1-172.27.
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Anonymus pragensis34, Duns Scotus35, Radulphus Brito36, John Buridan37 and 
Marsilius of Inghen38 even devoted entire questions of their commentaries to 
the problem. How they came to think of the question as a sensible one to ask 
is a puzzle worth solving. Sten Ebbesen39, Irène Rosier-Catach40 and Andrea 
Tabarroni41 have gone a long way in helping us understand more about the 
34 Anonymi pragensis, q. 28, pp. 64.8-66.14 asks the question in a slightly 
different form: «consequenter quaeritur utrum fallacia fi gurae dictionis habeat 
principium apparentiae ex parte vocis [the question arises next whether the origin of 
the fallacy of fi gure of speech has to do with verbal expression]».
35 Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super librum elenchorum Aristotelis, q. 37, 
pp. 437.1-443.6: «utrum fi gura dictionis sit locus in dictione [whether the fallacy of 
form of expression is a fallacy depending on expression]».
36 Not only Radulphus Brito asked the question, but he came as close as one 
can get to give the right answer: «cum dicitur “illa fallacia non est in dictione cuius 
causa apparentiae sumitur ex parte rei”, verum est. Et cum dicitur quod fallacia fi gurae 
dictionis est huiusmodi, falsum est, immo sumitur ex similitudine dictionis cum 
dictione, vel in modo appellandi vel in concretione vocum. Et cum dicitur quod ista 
fi t quando unum praedicamentum commutatur in aliud, verum est; sed hoc non est 
per similitudinem sumptam ex parte rei, sed [119] per similitudinem dictonis cum 
dictione, quae sumpta est ex parte vocis; et si commutatur unum praedicamentum in 
aliud per similitudinem sumptam ex parte rei, tunc magis habet esse fallacia accidentis 
[it is true to say that when the cause accounting for a fallacy’s deceptive appearance 
has to do with how things are, then the fallacy at hand is not a fallacy depending on 
expression. Nevertheless, if one says that such is the case of form of expression, he is 
wrong. On the contrary, what causes its deception has to do with the similarity among 
expressions, either through the way these expressions designate things or through their 
verbal morphology. Besides, if one says that the fallacy of form of expression occurs 
when a shift between categories occurs, he is right, but this does not happen because 
of a similarity between things, rather because of a similarity between expressions. If 
the shift between two categories is brought about by a similarity between things, then 
such an argument is rather a fallacy of accident]» (Radulphi britonis quaestiones super 
sophisticos elenchos, qu. 32, pp. 118.38-119.4).
37 Ioannis Buridani quaestiones elenchorum, q. 13, pp. 63-68.
38 Marsilii de Inghen quaestiones elenchorum, Wien, Österreichische 
Nationalbibliothek, 5342, qu. 24, ff. 43ra-44vb; Venezia, Marciana, Latina VI. 146 
(coll. 2658), qu. 23, f. 143r.
39 EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries, I, pp. 197-223.
40 I. ROSIER, «Évolution des notions d’equivocatio et univocatio au XIIe siècle», 
in I. ROSIER (ed.), L’ambiguïté, Presses Universitaires de Lille, Lille 1988, pp. 103-166.
41 A. TABARRONI, «Figure of Speech and Aristotle’s Division of Fallacies», in 
C. CELLUCCI – M. C. DI MAIO – G. RONCAGLIA (eds.), Logica e fi losofi a della scienza, 
ETS, Pisa 1994, pp. 15-24.
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problem and related issues (namely, the shifting association of the Boethian 
inherited fallacy of univocation and –in turn– homonymy, fi gure of speech 
and accident). As for today, I would like to add a new element to the picture. 
In order to do so I will follow a promising thread in an early –possibly the 
earliest– collection of quaestiones on Sophistici elenchi, whose author –a 
Parisian master of the 1270s– S. Ebbesen dubbed Anonymous cordubensis 
after the cordovan library where survives the only manuscript of his work. 
3. Anonymus C
SACRA PAGINA. Anonymi cordubensis quaestiones super sophisticos 
elenchos, q. 834, 352.14-353.28: «Consequenter quaeritur utrum fi gura 
dictionis sit fallacia in dictione. Et quod non videtur: omnis fallacia cuius 
principium apparentiae est a parte [353] rei et non a parte vocis est fallacia 
extra dictionem et non in dictione; fi gura dictionis est huiusmodi; quare et 
cetera. Maior patet, quia secundum Alexandrum ex hoc dicuntur fallaciae 
in dictione quia principium apparentiae habent a parte vocis, et fallaciae 
extra dictionem quia principium apparentiae habent a parte rei. Minor 
declaratur, nam ex eo quo ratio fallaciae sumitur ex sua causa apparentiae, 
et in quolibet modo fallaciae manet ratio fallaciae, necesse est in quolibet 
modo cuiuscumque fallaciae manere eandem causam apparentiae. Nunc 
in tertio modo fi gurae dictionis non est principium apparentiae a parte 
vocis, ut patet ibi: “Coriscus est alter ab homine, ergo est alter a se”, 
“Coriscus” enim et “homo” nullam convenientiam habent. Quare ibi causa 
apparentiae erit a parte rei [next the question arises whether the form of 
expression, as a source of fallacious reasoning, depends on expression. 
This appears not to be the case. Any fallacy whose appearance has factual 
rather than verbal grounds is a fallacy independent of expression rather 
than a fallacy depending on it[a]. Such is the case of <the fallacy of> form 
of expression. This is why, etc. The major premise is obvious, since –
according to «Alexander»[b]– fallacies, which depend on expression, are 
so called because of the verbal nature of what produces their illusion; on 
the other hand, fallacies, which do not depend on expression, are so called 
because of the factual nature of what produces their illusion. The minor 
premise is thus to be explained: since a fallacy is what it is on account 
of what produces its illusion and what makes it the fallacy it is remains 
the same throughout its modes[c], it is necessary that what produces its 
illusion remains the same in whichever variety a given fallacy comes. 
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Now, in the third mode of fallacies that depend on form of expression[d], 
what produces the illusion does not depend on words, as it becomes clear 
through this example[e]: “Coriscus is other than man; thus he is other than 
himself”[f]. As a matter of fact, the expressions “Coriscus” and “man” have 
no resemblance at all. This is why what produces here the illusion will be 
factual in nature]». 
Notulae. [a] «OMNIS FALLACIA CUIUS PRINCIPIUM APPARENTIAE EST 
A PARTE REI ET NON A PARTE VOCIS EST FALLACIA EXTRA DICTIONEM ET NON 
IN DICTIONE». I.e. any fallacy whose illusion or (deceptive) appearance 
depends on the things we say rather than on the way we talk about them 
falls outside expression. Anonymus cordubensis holds fast to what was 
at that time a commonplace. As a matter of fact, as early as the Anonymi 
glosae in Aristotelis Sophisticos elenchos, p. 205.7-9 and p. 213.27-
29 the association between in dictione and a parte vocis, on the one 
hand, and extra dictionem and a parte rei, on the other hand, appears 
to be taken for granted. As it will be afterwards: cf. Anonymi summa 
sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 286.19-21 and p. 353.14-16. Anonymi 
parisiensis compendium sophisticorum, p. 73.2-5. Anonymi compendiosus 
tractatus de fallaciis ex codice parisino latino 6674, Ed. by S. Ebbesen, 
Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin, 34 (1979) 186.48-
187.1. Anonymi Aurelianensis I commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos, 
pp. 132.29-133.2. Anonymi Aurelianensis II tractatus de paralogismis, 
pp. 51.28-52.2 and p. 157.16-19. Fallaciae parvipontanae, p. 551.10-27, 
p. 552.1-2 and p. 592.5-16. Anonymi fallacie londinenses, p. 647.6-8. 
Guillelmi de Montibus (?) fallaciae, p. 15.21-23. Tractatus de sophistica 
argumentatione (Dialectica monacensis), p. 558.25-27, p. 559.4-6 and 
p. 584.22-25. Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, p. 145.22-25. 
Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae, 16. Introductiones magistri Guillelmi de 
Shyrewode in logicam VI, p. 168.38-44. Nicholai parisiensis notulae super 
librum elenchorum, Praha Knihovna Metropolitni Kapituli, L.76 (1322), 
p. 61vb. Nicholai parisiensis de fallaciis (summae metenses), p. 474.1-10. 
Rogeri baconi summulae dialectices, pp. 239.26 - 240.9. Summa Lamberti 
VII, p. 146.20-36. Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, 
p. 846b 33-46. Thomae de Aquino (?) de fallaciis IV, pp. 405a 44 - 405b 
6 and p. 411a 1 - 411b 11. Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones 
super sophisticos elenchos, q. 35, p. 65.9-10. Aegidii romani expositio 
super libros elenchorum 27va 17-24 and 49rb 62 - 62va 15. Simonis de 
Faverisham quaestiones novae super libro elenchorum, q. 1, p. 106.95-
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99. Anonymi pragensis, q. 28, p. 64.13-15. Radulphi britonis quaestiones 
super sophisticos elenchos, p. 118.7-10 and p. 122.3-4. 
[b] «SECUNDUM ALEXANDRUM». As he already did in quaestio 820 
(p. 306.4-9) on this very issue, Anonymus C appeals here to the authority of 
what was believed to be Alexander of Aphrodisias’ exegesis of Aristotle’s 
Sophistici elenchi. The reference made to «Alexander» is merely a way of 
reproducing the traditional alternative, with a peculiar twist nonetheless, 
for the Anonymous is about to misapply it in his attempt to show –against 
Aristotle42 and, one might add, against exegetical common sense– that 
«form of expression» is a sophistic trick which does not depend on 
linguistic expression rather than one which exploits it to its advantage. 
[c] «IN QUOLIBET MODO FALLACIAE MANET RATIO FALLACIAE». Such continuity 
is quite understandable and refl ects the fact that –as a general rule– fallacies 
related to the same family are to be solved in one and the same way43. It is 
nonetheless about to backfi re and become a rather strong argument against 
Anonymus cordubensis view. As a matter of fact, the same consideration 
may be put forward to prove the opposite, as an interesting development in 
a relatively close text is to show: «sed illud non videtur omnino esse verum, 
quia ratio fallaciae sumitur a principio apparentiae. Si igitur sit fallacia una 
in quolibet modo, oportet principium manere unum in quolibet modo; et 
cum in fi gura dictionis principium apparentiae sit unitas vocis secundum 
qualitatem sub qua latent plura, cum similis modus appellandi non 
necessario habeat similitudinem vocis, non est hoc suffi ciens ad principium 
in hac fallacia [but this does not appear to be entirely true, since a fallacy is 
what it is on account of what produces its illusion. Now, if a fallacy is the 
same throughout its modes, what makes a fallacy what it is will necessarily 
be the same in each mode. Further, given that what produces the illusion in 
a fallacy of the form of expression is the qualitative unity of words which 
happen to stand for multiple things, in so far as similar designations are 
not necessarily expressed in the same way, this is not enough to cause that 
particular fallacy]» (Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones super 
Sophisticos elenchos, q. 76, p 173.40-46 ; cf. q. 74, pp. 169.22 - 170.31). 
[d] «IN TERTIO MODO FIGURAE DICTIONIS». Anonymus C refers to the 
well-known confusion between a «this something» and «what qualifi es it 
as the something it is» («ex mutatione quale quid in hoc aliquid»). Since 
42 Cf. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 4, 165b 23-27 (quoted above, note 3).
43 Cf. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 20, 177b 31-33 and 24, 179b 11-12. 
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A.J. Smith, «TODE TI in Aristotle», The Classical Review, 35, 1921, 
p. 19 the issue has been widely studied. Two essential readings deserve 
a special mention: J. Kung, «Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Third 
Man Argument», Phronesis, 26, 1981, pp. 207-247 and S. Ebbesen, «Hoc 
aliquid - Quale quid and the Signifi cation of Appellatives», Philosophia, 
5-6, 1975-1976, pp. 370-392.
[e] «UT PATET IBI». What follows is very much the linchpin of Anonymus 
C’s argument, which he regarded himself as the most substantial piece of 
evidence in order to prove that this mode of fi gura dictionis may be set 
apart from the others and be removed –so to speak– from within the sphere 
of language. 
[f] «CORISCUS EST ALTER AB HOMINE, ERGO EST ALTER A SE». What we have 
here is a distinguished argument in an abridged form. The missing premise 
–which is to be supplied from Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 33– 
being: «Coriscus est homo [Coriscus is a man]». 
LECTURA. This is hardly the most memorable piece of Aristotelian 
scholarship the Latin Middle Ages left us, but it is most certainly a text that 
has the qualities of its faults. Three deserve to be pointed out in particular: 
1.  One of Anonymus C’s assumptions rests on an apocryphal source: 
the Latin version of a commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias 
whose original greek version, if it ever existed, was long lost. 
2.  Anonymus C built his case on an example –«Coriscus est alter ab 
homine, ergo est alter a se»– which is both as Aristotelian as it gets 
and remarkably out of place. 
3.  Anonymus C hammered home his view by stating that «homo» and 
«Coriscus» bear no discernible similarity. 
PARERGA. Before taking up point two, which is by far the most 
important, a few words will suffi ce to explain why one may leave aside 
issues one and three: 
1.  It is true that Anonymus C trusted an authority which we know 
today is not the one he thought it to be. However, it doesn’t really 
matter whether he took so basic a principle of Aristotelian doctrine 
as the distinction between paralogisms in dictione and extra 
dictionem –directly– from Aristotle or –indirectly– from Pseudo-
Alexander. Furthermore, the enigma of the «Latin Alexander» has 
been brilliantly solved by Sten Ebbesen, who has proved that the 
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alleged Latin fragments of a lost Greek commentary by Alexander 
of Aphrodisias are, in fact, a set of scholia James of Venice drew 
from Micheal of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistici 
elenchi44. 
3.  It is also true that Anonymus C’s morphological speculations are 
completely beside the point. For one thing, he must have known 
very little Greek in order to miss the fact that, while «homo» and 
«Coriscus» do not bear any resemblance, Κορίσκος  and ἄνθρωπος 
do have the same form of expression. For another, he must have 
had very peculiar linguistic notions in order to believe that one may 
explain anything about what happens in his own language because 
of what happens in another. However, since the argument is an 
aristotelian example of the fallacy of accident45, it would reach its 
conclusion whatever the morphology of the words involved.
TRANSLATION MATTERS. When it comes to the second issue we 
encountered, it is an entirely different story. In fact, treating the «Coriscus 
other than himself» argument as a fallacy of fi gure of speech provides us 
with a lead as to how and why accidens ended up playing a key role in 
a discussion whose focus is fi gura dictionis, a different type of fallacy 
altogether. Since Anonymus cordubensis is far from being an isolated 
case, there’s only one plausible explanation for the consensus Latins 
reached over this particular issue, which is that the connection between the 
«Coriscus other than himself» argument and the fallacy of fi gure of speech 
was hinted at in Aristotle’s text itself. When Latin scholars rediscovered 
Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi –that is, about the time of Peter Abelard, 
Thierry of Chartres and Adam of Balsham (mid-XIIth century)– it was by 
and large through Boethius’ translation46. Not only did Boethius take a few 
44 S. EBBESEN himself tells the story of «Alexander»’s recovery in «The Greek 
under the Latin and the Latin under the Greek», Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction. 
Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen. Volume 1, Ashgate, Aldershot – Burlington 2008, 
pp. 1-7, a text philologists and philosophers alike should read each and every morning 
before starting to work. 
45 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 5, 166b 32-33: «οἷον “εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος ἕτερον 
ἀνθρώπου, αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἕτερος· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος” [for instance, if Coriscus is 
other than man, he is other than himself, for he is a man]». 
46 Cf. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, «Boezio, Giacomo Veneto, Guglielmo di Moerbeke, 
Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples e gli “Elenchi sophistici”», Rivista di fi losofi a neo-scolas-
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liberties with the text –mainly in the choice of examples47– but –what is 
more– he changed for good the face of at least one argument related to the 
form of expression. 
THE «THIRD MAN» ARGUMENT AND ITS LATIN AVATAR. It would require 
much labour to fully discuss the «Third man» argument. Besides, as it will 
soon become clear, its reconstruction is not –strictly speaking– required. A 
minimal account will do48. As conveyed by its conclusion (ὅτι ἔστι κτλ.) –
tica, 44 (1952) 399-400; «Jacobus Veneticus Grecus. Canonist and Translator 
of Aristotle», Traditio, 8 (1952) 265-304; «Gli “Elenchi sophistici”: redazioni 
contaminate colla ignota versione di Giacomo Veneto (?); frammenti dello ignoto 
commento d’Alessandro di Afrodisia tradotti in latino», Rivista di fi losofi a neo-
scolastica, 46 (1954) 222-231; «Giacomo Veneto e l’Aristotelismo Latino», in 
A. PERTUSI (ed.), Venezia e l’Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento, Sansoni, 
Firenze 1966, pp. 53-74. B. G. DOD, Praefatio, in Aristoteles latinus. De sophisticis 
elenchis. Translatio Boethii, Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi et Recensio 
Guillelmi de Moerbeke, Brill, Leiden 1975, pp. XII-XIV; «Aristoteles latinus», in 
N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration 
of Scholasticism (1100-1600), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, 
pp. 45-79. S. EBBESEN, «Jacobus Veneticus on the Posterior Analytics and Some 
Early 13th Century Oxford Masters on the Elenchi», CIMAGL, 21 (1977) 1-9; 
«Anonymi Aurelianensis I commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos. Introduction: 
Boethius, Jacobus Veneticus, Michael Ephesius and “Alexander”», CIMAGL, 
34 (1979) p. XXXVII; «Review Article. Union Académique Internationale Corpus 
Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Academiarum consociatarum auspiciis et consilio 
editum. Aristoteles Latinus VI I-3 De Sophisticis Elenchis Translatio Boethii, 
Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi, et Recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeke, Edidit 
Bernardus G. DOD, Brill, Leiden & Desclee de Brouwer, Bruxelles 1975, pp. XLII 
+ 152», Vivarium, 17 (1979) 69-80. 
47 A few Westerners seem to have been aware of the fact that Boethius did not 
translate but rather adapted (from Vergil and Horace) two of Aristotle’s examples. 
Cf. Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, p. 326.1-8; Anonymi parisiensis 
compendium sophisticorum, p. 84.23-28; Anonymi aurelianensis I commentarium 
in Sophisticos elenchos, p. 123.3-4 and p. 123.26-33; Anonymi Cantabrigiensis 
commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, 88Vb. Cf. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, «The 
Text of Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistici elenchi. The Latin Tradition», The Classical 
Quarterly, 5 (1955) 110. 
48 Interested readers will fi nd a more detailed story in L. GAZZIERO, «“Et 
quoniam est quis tertius homo”. Argument, exégèse, contresens dans la littérature 
latine apparentée aux Sophistici elenchi d’Aristote», Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du Moyen Âge, 80 (2013) 7-48. Relevant sources have been edited in 
L. GAZZIERO, «The Latin “Third Man”», op. cit., pp. 11-93. 
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which is, anyway, all Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 22, 178b 36 - 179a 10 has 
to offer– the agument aims at inferring the existence of a third man (a τρίτος 
ἄνθρωπος precisely) besides man himself (παρ’ αὐτὸν) and individual 
men (καὶ τοὺς καθ’ ἕκαστον). Even if Aristotle’s main concern is to 
explain how to avoid the «Third man» rather than to recount the argument 
itself, one can be reasonably sure that the decisive move is to bring about 
the idea that the universal is on a par with the particulars whose universal 
it is, for –as Aristotle says in 179a 4-5– «οὐτὸ ἐκτίθεσθαι δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν 
τρίτον ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι εἶναι συγχωρεῖν [setting apart 
does not produce the “Third Man”, rather the admission that <what is set 
apart> is an individual thing]». All of which makes excellent sense, given 
that Aristotle thought that –no matter how dire the consequences– being 
wrong about which is which between particulars and universals is an easy 
mistake to make and, more to the point, a mistake we cannot easily avoid 
because of what can only be described as a fact of language. In fact, not 
only is it most natural to assume that everything we say refers to something 
that exists49, but such delusion is all the more likely to occur when talking 
about substances, as one can easily draw from a well-known passage of 
Aristotle’s Categories50, where the way we name things is held responsible 
49 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 6, 168a 25-26: «σύνηθες γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὡς τόδε 
τι σημαίνειν [we usually speak of everything as though it were an individual thing]»; 
cf. 7, 169a 33-34: «πᾶν τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινος ὑπολαμβάνομεν τόδε τι [we 
trust everything predicated of something else to be an individual thing]». 
50 Aristotelis Categoriae, Ed. by R. BODÉÜS, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001, 5, 
3b 10-18: «πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων 
οὐσιῶν ἀναμϕισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει· ἄτομον γὰρ 
καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ϕαίνεται μὲν 
ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον 
ἢ ζῷον· οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, - οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται 
καὶ τὸ ζῷον. οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ 
ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ 
ποιὸν ἀϕορίζει -, ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει [it looks like every substance 
refers to an individual thing. As far as primary substances are concerned it is true and 
undisputable that each refers to an individual thing, for what we refer to is something 
particular and one in number. As for the secondary substances, on the other hand, 
they seem to refer to an individual thing, as when we say “man” or “animal”, on 
account of the form of denomination (τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας). Yet, this is 
not true, for they rather signify something that is such and such. In fact, the subject 
is not one, as in the case of primary substances; in fact, man and animal are said 
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for this confusion: the form of appellatives being roughly the same in all 
cases, it is not by means of a linguistic analysis that one shall settle whether 
a given name refers to a particular or to a universal thing. Be that as it may, 
Boethius’ translation of «καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ’ αὐτὸν 
καὶ τοὺς καθ’ ἕκαστον» was to change the game altogether, since it sounds 
«et quoniam est quis tertius homo A SE ET AB UNOQUOQUE», which is as literal 
as it gets, except for the fact that Boethius translated as if his Greek model 
read αὐτὸν  instead of αὑτὸν51. As a result, Latin commentators understood 
the expression tertius a se as if it meant either diversus a se (different from 
himself) or alter a se (other than himself), which –as far as I know– they did 
without exception52. Such understanding proved fatal for the «Third man». 
of many things. That being said, secondary substances do not mean a quality tout 
court, as white does. As a matter of fact, white means just a quality, whereas species 
and genus have more to do with a determination of the substance, they rather signify 
what qualifi es a given substance as the substance it is]». For all practical purposes, the 
σχῆμα τῆς προσηγορίας is synonymous with the σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως of the fallacy 
of the same name: προσηγορία is the denomination according to a certain name (the 
term occurs in Aristotle’s defi nition of παρώνυμα in chapter one of the Categories: 
«παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαϕέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα 
προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικ ῆ ς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς 
ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος [we call paronym things that are named after something else 
through a fl exion of the name of the latter: for instance, grammarian is named after 
grammar and brave after bravery]» (Aristotelis Categoriae, 1, 1a 12-15). Both notion 
and their relation have been thoroughly dealt with by F. Ildéfonse, «Ta skhêmata tês 
lexeôs», in M. S. CELENTANO – P. CHIRON – M.-P. NOËL (eds.), Skhèma/Figura. Formes 
et fi gures chez les Anciens. Rhétorique, philosophie, littérature, Editions Rue d’Ulm/
ENS, Paris 2004, pp. 143-157. 
51 Since it is more than likely that the oncial letters of his manuscript lacked 
diacritical marks, it does not come as a surprise that Boethius got the breathing wrong. 
52 Roberti Grosseteste quod fertur commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by 
L. GAZZIERO, «The Latin “Third Man”», op. cit., pp. 30-32; Petri hispani portugalensis 
tractatus VIII, pp. 141.31-143.19; Anonymi Monacensis Commentarium in 
Sophisticos Elenchos, pp. 33-44; Roberti Kilwardby (?) commentarium in Sophisticos 
Elenchos, pp. 45-53; Nicholai Parisiensis Notulae super librum elenchorum, 54-59; 
Roberti <Kilwardby ?> commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, pp. 60-67; Roberti 
de Aucumpno commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, pp. 68-82; Alberti magni 
expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, pp. 938b-939a; Roberti anglici commentarium in 
Sophisticos elenchos, Ed. by L. GAZZIERO, «The Latin “Third Man”», op. cit., pp. 83-
87; Thomae de Aquino (?) de fallaciis IX, p. 411.66-81; Anonymi salmaticensis-
fl orentini quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, q. 80, pp. 179-185; Aegidii Romani 
expositio super libros Elenchorum, 54va-55rb; Anonymi bavarici lectura super librum 
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To make another long story short, this is how the argument was refi ned out 
of existence: Latin commentators just lost sight of the «Third man» as an 
argument and resorted to those they had at hand in order to make sense of 
what they read. As it happens, they had the good fortune and the fl air to 
fi nd a perfect match in Aristotle’s discussion of the fallacies of accident. 
As true to the text as Boethius allowed them to be, they were brought to 
take the «tertius a se» apart from the «ab unoquoque». Instead of thinking 
of them as two clauses of one and the same conclusion («there is a “third 
man” beside man and individual men»), Latin commentators considered 
the «tertius a se» and the «ab unoquoque» as two different conclusions («a 
given man is other than himself» and «he is other than any other man»). 
Therefore, if there are two conclusions instead of one, there are also two 
arguments rather than one. This split issue became the standard story and 
we fi nd it repeated time and again in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries53. If the 
second line of reasoning, which stipulates that a man differs from any other 
(«ab unoquoque»), is usually treated as a mere repetition of the fi rst, whose 
conclusion is that a man differs from himself («a se»)54, Latin commentators 
displayed sometimes an uncanny ingenuity. The palm of sophistication goes 
to Anonymus bavaricus who most of the time rates as an average, run-of-
the-mill commentator. On this occasion, nevertheless, he outdid himself 
Elenchorum, Ed. by L. GAZZIERO, «The Latin “Third Man”», op. cit., pp. 88-91; 
Anonymi Cordubensis quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, q. 838, pp. 362-366; 
Simonis de Faverisham quaestiones novae super libro elenchorum, q. 19, pp. 148-150; 
Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super librum elenchorum Aristotelis, q. 41, pp. 459-
463; Anonymi expositio super libros Elenchorum, Ed. by L. GAZZIERO, «The Latin 
“Third Man”», op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
53 Anonymus monacensis is as good an example as any and more explicit than 
most: «“QUONIAM QUIS HOMO”, id est aliquis homo, “EST TERTIUS”, id est diversus a se 
ipso. Et per hoc habetur conclusio primi paralogismi. “ET AB UNOQUOQUE”, id est aliquis 
homo potest concludi esse diversus ab unoquoque alio. Et per hoc habetur conclusio 
secundi paralogismi [“QUONIAM QUIS HOMO”, that is: a certain man; “EST TERTIUS”, that 
is: is different from himself; and we have here the conclusion of the fi rst sophism. 
“ET AB UNOQUOQUE”, that is: it may be inferred that a certain man is different from any 
other. And we have here the conclusion of the second sophism]» (Anonymi monacensis 
commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, p. 35). 
54 Anonymi monacensis commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, p. 35; Roberti 
<Kilwardby> commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, p. 46; Roberti de Aucumpno 
commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, p. 69; Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum 
elenchorum, p. 938b 21-33; Roberti anglici commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos, 
p. 83; Aegidii romani expositio super libros elenchorum 54va 3-7.
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(and everybody else in the process). As a matter of fact, not only did he pull 
two arguments out of his sleeve where there was only one to begin with, 
but he also managed to match them perfectly with the fi rst and the second 
example Aristotle offered of the fallacy of accident55. If symmetry is the seal 
of truth, seldom two wrongs came so close to make a right.
EPILEGOMENA. Whether in its more subtle formula or in its ordinary 
capacity, the appeal of this solution was immensely strong. While nothing 
in Aristotle’s words pointed in its direction, the association of the «Third 
man» and the «Coriscus other than himself» sophism proved so successful 
that more than one Latin reader believed he found it in Aristotle’s text 
itself. Around 1280, Simon of Faversham –who was neither the fi rst nor the 
last to do so56– quoted Aristotle himself as the fi nal authority on the issue: 
55 Anonymi bavarici lectura super librum Elenchorum, p. 88: «Primus paralogismus 
formatur sic: “ab homine Coriscus est alter; Coriscus est homo; ergo, alter a se”. 
Conclusionem solum ponit cum dicit: “ET QUONIAM QUIS”: id est, aliquis est homo tertius 
a se et paralogyzetur sicut dictum est. Tunc ponit alium cum dicit: “Coriscus est alter a 
Platone et Plato est homo, ergo alter ab homine”. Conclusionem ponit cum dicit “ET AB 
UNOQUOQUE” [the fi rst paralogism goes like this: “Coriscus is other than man; therefore 
he is other than himself”. Aristotle states the conclusion only: “ET QUONIAM QUIS”, that 
is to say: some man is other than himself, and the paralogism is argued for as it has 
been said. Then he brings about the other paralogism: “Coriscus is other than Socrates; 
Socrates is a man; therefore Coriscus is other than man”. Aristotle states the conclusion 
when he says: “ET AB UNOQUOQUE”]». NOTA BENE: «ab homine Coriscus est alter; Coriscus 
est homo; ergo, alter a se» is none other than the fi rst fallacy of accident Aristotle 
discussed at the beginning of chapter 5 of Sophistici elenchi (quoted above, note 45); 
while «Coriscus est alter a Platone et Plato est homo, ergo alter ab homine» –apart from 
the fact that Plato has replaced Socrates– is pretty much the same as the second fallacy 
of accident Aristotle discussed right after the fi rst we just mentioned: «ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους 
ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, ἕτερον ἀθρώπου ϕασὶν ὡμολογηκέναι διὰ 
τὸ συμβεβηκέναι οὗ ἔϕησεν ἕτερον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον [otherwise, if 
Coriscus is other than Socrates, since Socrates is a man, they pretend that it has been 
admitted that he is other than man because of the fact that man is predicated of Socrates 
and Coriscus is said to be other than Socrates]» (Aristotelis sophistici elenchi 5, 166b 
33-36). 
56 Cf. Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus VII, p. 142.4-8; Roberti <Kilwardby> 
Commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos, p. 51; Nicholai parisiensis notulae super 
librum elenchorum, p. 54; Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, 
p. 939a; Anonymi salmaticensis-fl orentini quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, 
q. 80, p. 179.21-23 and q. 85, p. 196.16-21; Anonymi Cordubensis quaestiones super 
sophisticos elenchos, q. 838, p. 363.32-33; Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super 
librum elenchorum Aristotelis, q. 41, p. 460.14-17. 
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«Philosophus dicit, secundo huius, quod hic est fi gura dictionis: “Coriscus 
est alter ab homine; ergo, Coriscus est alter a se” [says the Philosopher, in 
the second book <of the Sophistici elenchi>, that we have here a case of 
fallacy of fi gure of speech: “Coriscus is other than man ; therefore he is 
other than himself”]»57. It would not be historically accurate to say that the 
collapse of the Latin «Third man» brought alone the fallacy of accident and 
the fallacy of fi gure of speech together. That said, the exegetical anomaly 
it turned out to be soon became the single strongest reason in favour of this 
unlikely association. At any rate, it proved compelling enough to make 
Latin commentators wonder wether some fallacies of form of expression 
fall outside expression itself and to persuade some of them that, contrary to 
all expectations, this may well be the case.
57 Simonis de Faverisham quaestiones novae super libro elenchorum, q. 19, 
p. 148.17-18. As is well known, a distinctive feature of the Latin tradition of Aristotle’s 
tract was its division in two books: the fi rst ends at 16, 175 where the second begins. 
This division is –in all probability– a Latin invention, for there is no trace of it in 
Aristotle nor in the Greek and Byzantine tradition. That being said, it is far from 
arbitrary. As a matter of fact, the fi rst fi fteen chapter of Aristotle’s work’s focus is upon 
sophistic objectives (metae) and techniques (fallaciae). From chapter 16 on, Aristotle’s 
attention turns to the ways we can counter or neutralize sophistic arguments.
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